SUPREME COURT, U. S.

Supreme Court, U. S.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 74-1551

DELOY C. ROSS,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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

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The petitioner Deloy C. Ross respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in this proceeding on April 21, 1975, rehearing denied May 16, 1975. A stay of mandate was issued by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pending appeal to this court no later than June 15, 1975.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet reported, appears in the Appendix A attached hereto. No opinion rendered by the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana is reported.

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JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was entered on April 21, 1975. The petition for rehearing *en banc* was denied on May 16, 1975, and this petition for certiorari was filed within 30 days of that date. The court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 USC § 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is it reversible error for the District Court to permit the Government to obtain from a third party thief documents which are the property of the accused; refused to grant the rule 16(b) FRCP which motion to inspect and copy these same documents; and to permit the Government to use on a selective basis these same documents against the accused at the time of trial?

2. Is evidence stolen by a third party during a Government criminal investigation which was then obtained under circumstances not shown to be "voluntary" excludable under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to *Knoll Associates, Inc.* v. *FTC*, 397 F 2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968)?

3. Is the Government required to show that stolen evidence, both that which is introduced at trial and that which is withheld from defense inspection, obtained from a third party thief, is acquired with the third party's consent and not mere acquiescence under *Bumper* v. *North Carolina*, 391 US 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (1968)?

4. Is the Government's secret withholding of stolen evidence from a third party thief during a criminal investigation a violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment?

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Code, Title 18:

§ 3771 Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

The rule reads as follows:

> Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the government, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses (other than the defendant) to agents of the government except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS INVOLVED

Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution

The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:

> The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution

The Fifth Amendment reads as follows:

> No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner, defendant in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Deloy C. Ross, was in 1973 charged by indictments with filing a false and fraudulent income tax return and with willfully attempting to evade income tax due on behalf of himself and his wife for the years 1966, 1967 and 1968, and was indicted for the same offense for the years 1968 and 1969 in connection with his activities in Ross Investments, Inc., a corporation (26 U.S.C. 7201). The defendant was tried before a jury in the Western District of Louisiana and on June 7, 1974 the jury found the petitioner guilty on all counts.

The Government's case against the defendant Ross was based entirely upon the well-known and much used net worth theory. The defendant Ross asserted the affirmative defense that any unexplained increase in his net worth during the years in question was not the result of any willful evasion or nonpayment of income taxes due to the Internal Revenue Service, but was due to the re-

ceipt of gifts from his father, W. C. Ross, prior to the time of his father's demise in March 11, 1969.

At the time of the father's death, Deloy Ross, the defendant below, became the owner of all of his father's books, records and papers. During the pretrial stage, indeed during the pre-indictment stage which commenced May 6, 1969, the petitioner Ross repeatedly made his position known to IRS agents and to the U.S. Attorney, by documents submitted, by conferences and by telephone calls. From the beginning there was never any question or doubt but that the petitioner admitted to an increased net worth and asserted that the increase was due in substantial part to gifts which he had received from his father. The petitioner Ross having asserted this theory of increased net worth realized, with the advice of counsel, that he was asserting an affirmative defense and it was therefore incumbent upon him to establish the validity of this defense.

The petitioner Ross in order to establish an affirmative defense assembled all of his own books, records and accounting reports, as well as other material data, and had all of this material analyzed and evaluated by competent accountants and with the assistance of his own counsel prepared this material in such a manner as to be presented at his trial in order to produce its maximum evidentiary value for the petitioner. Having adopted this theory of defense, Ross and his counsel realized that they indirectly placed in issue petitioner's father's net worth for each material year. During the investigation of the petitioner, a William Taylor in 1970 took from one of Deloy Ross' properties numerous business records, referred to in testimony on the motion for a new trial in the District Court as a "carload and a truckload" of the petitioner's documents and records. Most of these records were documents that formerly belonged to the father of the petitioner but which the petitioner had inherited.

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The records stretched back to the early forties and late fifties. During the investigatory period the petitioner was not entirely sure where or how these documents had disappeared. It was not learned by petitioner and his counsel until during the trial on May 29, 1974 that the stolen documents were turned over to agents of the IRS and that for over three years the petitioner's property was therefore directly or indirectly within the possession and control of the U.S. Attorney.

In preparation for trial and in order to obtain all available documents which might assist the defendant in establishing his affirmative defense, counsel for the defendant Ross filed a motion pursuant to 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for discovery and inspection of:

A. All books, records, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects and material obtained from or belonging to the accused;

B. Copies of all books, records, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects and material obtained from or belonging to the accused;

C. All books, records, papers, documents, tangible objects and material from whomsoever obtained which are favorable to the accused on the issue of his guilt or punishment and which will aid him in the preparation of his defense;

D. All books, records, papers, documents and physical material which the Government intends to offer as evidence in this case.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion finds and contends that this motion was granted. It is indisputable that the Government did not turn over for discovery or inspection all the documents called for by the defendant's 16(b) motion, and there is no dispute but what the defendant Ross in the District Court did

not have the benefit of use, or even of inspection, of these records which were in possession of the Government.

Thereafter, during the trial in the District Court the U.S. Attorney selectively introduced 24 out of 144 monthly profit and loss statements; the very same documents which the defendant had sought to obtain by his rule 16(b) motion. These documents were introduced into evidence against the petitioner over the general objection of his counsel. (The record does not clearly indicate how the District Court treated the government's objection to this objection.) It was only then that he saw for the first time some of the very documents which he had sought to obtain by pretrial motion and learned for the first time who had stolen them. From that point on the thief of the documents was absent evidently by "design".

In arguing the rule 16(b) motion in the District Court, the defendant Ross was at an extreme disadvantage from the standpoint of establishing the materiality of the very documents which he was seeking to obtain. In effect, he and his counsel had to be able to see the documents in order to establish their materiality or be blessed with a remarkable memory because after all most of the stolen documents were originally his father's documents or kept by him as his son's employee, and he therefore did not have the same familiarity with the contents of the documents as his father would have had, had he been alive. Nevertheless, any of the petitioners own documents in a complex tax case are not readily reconstructed from memory. One quick test of the materiality of the documents which were being sought under rule 16(b) can be established by the fact that the U.S. Attorney found some of the documents to be extremely material. In fact, they were so vitally material that the U.S. Attorney used them in evidence against the defendant Ross.

Subsequent to the entry of the jury's guilty verdict the defendant's counsel filed a motion for a new trial and a

hearing was had thereon. It was at this time that counsel for the petitioner learned that four boxes of stolen documents were still in possession of the Government. The court received the documents and placed them under seal after a brief secret examination. One of the principal grounds asserted in support of the motion for a new trial was the fact that at no time prior to trial, nor during trial, was the defendant Ross permitted to inspect or use his own documents. It was the contention of the defendant Ross that had he had access to the documents in question, he would have been able to establish to the satisfaction of the jury that the unexplained increase in his net worth during the years in question was, in fact, the result of substantial gifts from his father. The motion for new trial was denied.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES CONFLICTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICATION OF DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognizes that denial of a reasonable discovery request for no good reason "cannot be excused as an exercise of the trial judges discretion under the Rule." *United States* v. *Bushton*, 463 F 2d 887, 983 (1972). The court in so observing referred to *United States* v. *Bryant*, 439 F 2d 642 (1971) a case involving 16(a) discovery.

One's private financial records can, depending on the individual, be vast and complex. Memory alone cannot catalogue and retain their every significance, particularly with regard to the complexities of the tax laws. Without discovery and inspection as provided for by rule 16(b),

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the petitioner was unable to properly prepare for trial. The documents stolen during the Government's investigation could not be reconstructed to use himself or to counter inferences that might be derived from them. The evidence still under seal might as well be lost or destroyed as far as the petitioner is concerned.[1]

The court, through Judge Skelly Wright, in *United States* v. *Bryant* observed with regard to the prosecution's disclosure study:[2]

> The purpose of the duty is not simply to correct an imbalance of advantages, whereby the prosecution may surprise the defense at trial with new evidence; rather, *it is also* to make of the trial a search for truth informed by all relevant material, much of which, because of inbalance in investigative resources, will be exclusively in the hands of the government (citation omitted, emphasis supplied).

And with regard to evidence to which one is left, "entirely in the dark," the court said:[3]

> There is not simply 'substantial room for doubt'[4] but room for nothing except doubt as to the effect of disclosure.

The case was remanded.

Even if the discovery motion had been granted entirely, the government failed to abide by it. In so doing the government gravely violated the rights secured to the petitioner under this rule for a reasonable inspection of his own property which was material to his trial and his defense. In *Bass* v. *United States*, 239 F 2d 711 (6th Cir 1957) the court held that the defendant should have

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[1] *C.f. United States* v. *Heath*, 260 F 2d 623 (9th Cir. 1958), in which evidence was destroyed and the directed verdict of acquittal was upheld.

[2] 439 F 2d at 648.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] See footnote 8 and text 439 F 2d at 648.

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been entitled to inspection of evidence obtained from a third party belonging to him and said:

> Appellant had a right equal to that of the government to use the same documents in the same way to prepare for trial. A denial of this right calls for reversal.[5]

Rule Sixteen was changed in 1966 and in subdivision (b) "obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process" was omitted. These limitations were eliminated to broaden the scope of discovery not to limit it.[6]

The standard of materiality and reasonableness cannot be met by a defendant where there is a vast amount of documents which the Fifth Circuit seems to feel should be computerized in defendants own "knowledge". In a complex networth tax case materiality of documents requires time and careful analysis.[7] The court in *United States* v. *Tanner*, 279 F Supp 457 (N.D. Ill 1967) quoted from a learned law review article[8] by Mr. Daniel Rezneck on this subject which in substance pointed out that:

> . . . [I]t may be difficult to demonstrate the materiality of what has not been seen.
>
> Anything the government plans to introduce against the defendant at trial would obviously be material to the preparation of his defense and a request to inspect it would be reasonable. . . .
>
> Reasonableness is a closely related requirement [to materiality]. A request for items material to

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[5] At 716. See e.g. *United States* v. *Fancher*, 195 FS 448, 450 (D. Conn 1961); *United States* v. *Cohen*, 15 FRD 269 (S.D. N.Y. 1953); *United States* v. *Parr*, 17 FRD 512 (S.D. Tex. 1955); *United States* v. *Bennethum*, 21 FRD 227 (D. Del. 1957); *United States* v. *Skindler*, 24 FRD 142 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).

[6] Introduction to committee note to Rule 16.

[7] *United States* v. *Tanner*, 279 F Supp. 457, 470 (N.D. Ill 1967).

[8] 54 GEO. L. J. 1276, 1279-1290 (1966).

> the preparation of the defense would ordinarily be reasonable, unless, for example, the defendant already had some other access to the matters sought.

In the instant case, memory concerning the contents of the petitioner's documents as well as ignorance of the details of documents once belonging to the petitioner's father effectively created a situation wherein the defendant might as well have never seen the documents. It is absurd to say that it is within his knowledge that documents stretching back over 20 years should be intimately "known". Of course, as Mr. Rezneck points out, those documents introduced are inherently material and it is only reasonable to request discovery of support documents in preparation for trial in order to refute contrary conclusions the Government should use or make. As the court said in *United States* v. *Procareo*: [9]

> . . . [I]t is difficult to understand how a defendant can, in advance of trial, adequately prepare to meet the charge unless he has access to basic records.

In addition, it is somewhat outrageous that the district court could examine secretly in thirty minutes four cases of documents that would take an accountant an extensive amount of time to analyze [10] and then declare the material only non-exculpatory.

The Second Circuit has recognized the need for fairness with regard to subdivision (a) of Rule Sixteen.[11] As with those cases, the tactics of the Government in this case "smacks too much of a trial by ambush, in violation of the spirit of the rules." [12]

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[9] 34 FRD 486, 488 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).

[10] See *Holland* v. *United States*, 348 U.S. 121, 127, 75 S.Ct. 127, 132 (1955); *United States* v. *Shindler*, 24 FRD 142, 145 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).

[11] *United States* v. *Kelley*, 420 F 2d 26, 28-29 (2nd Cir. 1969); *United States* v. *Baum*, 482 F 2d 1325, 1332 (2nd Cir 1973).

[12] *United States* v. *Baum*, 482 F 2d at 1332.

In the Third Circuit *a much broader* discovery request than the instant case was granted, upheld, and the defendant foreclosed from the complaint that too much material was disclosed.[13] Certainly in the Fifth Circuit a request for four boxes of the defendants own property is not unreasonable.

Moreover, the Government should not be allowed to compound an illegal act during its investigation or aid and abet the commission of a crime, even if it were a crime it could not prosecute. If the United States Government can cooperate with local authorities to enforce state criminal laws, it should not on mere whim ignore a local crime to its advantage. Under the court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the Federal courts,[14] the Government should be required to proceed openly and fairly, particularly when stolen evidence is involved in its prosecution and when discovery of such evidence is material and reasonable.

By sanctioning the admissibility of privately stolen evidence and conviction thereon this court permits disrespect for the law that protects not only a person's constitutional rights but also his legal rights in his property. And where privately seized or stolen property is evidence requested by the Government, the Government should in the light of day obtain the property, thereby allowing a victimized citizen to regain what is rightfully his or at least know where his property has disappeared. Indeed, it is admirable to encourage third party citizens to be cooperative in criminal investigations of others, but not to the extent that private vigilantism is encouraged or private burglaries are encouraged. The whole purpose of law and order is otherwise defeated.

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[13] *United States* v. *Kenny*, 462 F 2d 1205 (3rd Cir 1972) cert den. 409 U.S. 914, 93 S.Ct. 233.

[14] *McNabb* v. *United States*, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943).

2. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER.

In *Knoll Associates, Inc.* v. *FTC*, 397 F 2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) the Government during the course of its investigation of Clayton Act violations received from a third party stolen business documents belonging to the defendant. The court in its fifth footnote at page 535 distinguished *Burdeau* v. *McDowell*, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574 (1921) on the observation that the *Burdeau* documents were stolen months before the initiation of the Government investigation. Consequently there was no nexus or taint of Government approval for private theft and seizure of a persons property or papers which would normally violate the Fourth Amendment as intimated by *Burdeau.*[15]

The financial records secretly in the possession of the Government belonged to Deloy C. Ross because (1) he owned the store, the land and W. C. Ross & Sons entirely since 1946 and never sold the business of or the name of W. C. Ross & Sons; (2) he maintained ownership of the documents on his property[16] even after the abandonment of the store by the caretaker of the documents; and (3) whatever portion of the stolen documents that originally were his father's he inherited from his father. The thief as a step-brother had no ownership right or interest in the documents other than the fact

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[15] 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S.Ct. 574, 576; *United States* v. *Harper*, 458 F 2d 891 (7th Cir 1971) cert den. 406 U.S. 930, 92 S.Ct. 1772.

[16] The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made a factual error in that Deloy C. Ross sold the *inventory* of W. C. Ross & Sons but he did not sell the building, land or business name to the thief. That is to say, he did *not* sell the "store". Trial Transcript page 1798. The deed to the property is recorded at Book 162 page 590, Parish of Vernon, Leesville, Louisiana.

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that prior to his abandoning the store premises [17] and his caretaker duty of the records, he had the duty of their safekeeping.[18] He had no authority to remove or consent to removal of the documents for his own use or that of the Government.[19] He had no right of "mutual use" of the documents at any time.[20] Indeed, his reentry of the abandoned store amounts to theft by unlawful entry.

The theft of Deloy Ross' financial records was during the investigation by the IRS as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals notes. Had Deloy Ross been accused and tried in the Seventh Circuit the evidence introduced against the petitioner would be suppressible under the Fourth Amendment and the *Knoll* decision.

In such situations where the Government takes advantage of crimes of individuals, the words of Justice Brandeis in his dissent in *Burdeau* v. *McDowell* [21] become more urgent:

> At the foundation of our civil liberties lies the principle which denies to the government officials an exceptional position before the law, and which subjects them to the same rules of conduct that are

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[17] Trial Transcript, page 1813 line 15.

[18] Trial Transcript, page 1798.

[19] It has not been established if consent was "voluntarily" given or if there was trick or coercion vis a vis the thief with regard to the documents still withheld. See reason #3 below.

[20] *Matlock* v. *United States*, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988 (1974) at footnote 7: "Common authority is, of course, not to be implied here from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements, . . . (citation omitted) but rests rather on *mutual use* of the property by persons generally leaving joint access or control *for most purposes*, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the right to *permit inspection in his own right*. . . . (emphasis supplied)

[21] 256 U.S. at 477, 41 S.Ct. at 576-577.

commands to the citizen. And in the development of our liberty, insistence upon procedural regularity has been a large factor. *Respect for law will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to means which shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play.* (emphasis supplied)

3. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DECISION BELOW IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION OF THIS COURT REQUIRING THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOW THAT EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM A THIRD PARTY THIEF WAS OBTAINED VOLUNTARILY AND WITHOUT MERE ACQUIESCENCE.

As this court has reiterated in *Schneckloth* v. *Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 223, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2045 (1973), when the Government relies on the consent of a third party to justify the lawfulness of a search, the Government "has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given" without mere acquiescence *Bumper* v. *North Carolina*, 391 U.S. 543, 548-549, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968). With regard to documents still withheld from the petitioners inspection, the Government did not so show this because the one person able to testify as to the voluntariness of the consent to the IRS search and seizure, the thief, disappeared before his significance was realized. Considering his theft it is understandable why he did. And there is no indication that the Government searched for the witness—undoubtedly conduct favoring his theft and unlawful entry. With regard to the evidence stolen which was admitted, these were evidently received from the thief's attorney but this is not entirely clear.

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4. THE GOVERNMENT'S OBTAINING PETITIONER'S DOCUMENTS FROM A THIRD PARTY THIEF IS A VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.

In *Gouled* v. *United States*, 225 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261 (1921) this court said that the bill of rights "should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts, or by well intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers." [22] In the present case the Government has taken advantage of a crime in order to rob the petitioner of due process.

In *Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee* v. *McGarth*, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624 (1951) Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion made some basic observations about "the deep-rooted demands of fair play enshrined in the Constitution." In that case the Committee was designated communist "without notice, without disclosure of any reasons justifying it, without opportunity to meet the undisclosure evidence or suspicion on which designation was may have been based, and without opportunity to establish affirmatively that the aims and acts of the organization are innocent." [23] All this was "devoid of fundamental fairness as to offend the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."

Justice Frankfurter expounds:[24]

> ". . . [D]ue process", unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances expressing as it does in its untimate analysis respect enforced by

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[22] 225 U.S. at 304, 41 S.Ct. at 263.

[23] 341 U.S. at 161, 71 S.Ct. at 643.

[24] 341 U.S. at 162-3, 71 S.Ct. at 643-4.

> law for that feeling of just treatment. . . . "Due process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more *particularly between the individual and government*, "due process" is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decision and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inexcapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusts with the unfolding of the process. (emphasis supplied)

In the instant case the petitioner's property was taken twice: once by a third party thief and then by the Government. The later, like the thief, took that evidence introduced into trial without disclosure of any legal reasons justfying such taking of his property and that evidence which is still suppressed left the petitioner without opportunity to meet or use his secretly held property. In short the petitioner is deprived the opportunity to prepare his defense, and such deprivation was without due process.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Fifth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John L. Ingoldsby

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June 2, 1975

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 2d day of June, 1975, three copies of the Petition for writ of Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. Robert H. Bork, Solicitor General of the United States, Justice Department, Washington, D.C. 20530.

/s/ John L. Ingoldsby

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APPENDIX A

Fifth Circuit Opinion and Judgment Copied

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 74-2969

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DELOY C. ROSS,
Defendant-Appellant.

* * * *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before AINSWORTH, GODBOLD and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges.

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Deloy C. Ross appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial on five counts of evasion of federal income tax. He raises three issues on this appeal: that the trial court improperly denied in part his motion for discovery under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16; that the prosecution failed to fulfill its obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense under Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); and that the Government denied him due process and violated his Fourth Amendment rights in acquiring from a third party certain papers and records allegedly belonging to him. We affirm the conviction.

I. Factual Background of the Investigation and Trial

In May 1969, two Internal Revenue Service agents interviewed Deloy Ross and told him that they were undertaking an investigation of his tax returns that might lead to criminal charges. After conferring with his accountant and attorney, Ross agreed to permit the agents to inspect and hand copy business records to be provided him at his accountant's office. These records included accounting books and corporate records of a motel owned by Ross, of Ross Investments, Inc., and of W. C. Ross & Son, a general store partnership between Ross and his father (W. C. Ross) which was dissolved in January 1968. These records were for tax years 1965 through 1969. It was agreed that none of the records thus provided was to be Xeroxed or removed by the IRS agents.

As part of their investigation the IRS agents interviewed defendant's step-brother, William Taylor. Defendant had sold the store operated under the W. C. Ross & Son partnership to Taylor in 1968, and several boxes containing financial records of the partnership remained there. In September 1970, Taylor took these records to attorneys looking into his claims against his mother's estate. In March 1971, Taylor retrieved some of these records and turned them over to the IRS agents, in response to their request. The agents received the remaining records directly from the attorneys, with Taylor's permission. This investigation culminated in indictments against Deloy Ross for evasion of income tax owed by himself and his wife for 1966, 1967, and 1968, and for evasion of income tax owed by Ross Investments, Inc. for 1968 and 1969.

The Government's case at trial was proved by the "net worth" method, which is used to establish a taxpayer's true income when there is no direct proof of the unreported income. The net worth method involves

calculating the taxpayer's assets and liabilities at the beginning of the relevant tax period to establish an initial net worth. The same calculation is performed as to assets and liabilities at the end of the tax period. If the taxpayer's increase in net worth plus his living expenses for that tax period exceed his reported income and cannot be explained by receipt of nontaxable income, the existence of unreported income may be inferred.

Before trial defendant filed a written motion seeking discovery from the Government of

A. All books, records, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects and material obtained from or belonging to the accused;

B. Copies of all books, records, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects and material obtained from or belonging to the accused;

C. All books, records, papers, documents, tangible objects and material from whomsoever obtained which are favorable to the accused on the issue of his guilt or punishment and which will aid him in the preparation of his defense;

D. All books, records, papers, documents and physical material which the Government intends to offer as evidence in this case.

This motion was granted, and the Government provided defendant with a set of computations and data sheets it developed in attempting to establish the amount of unreported income attributable to defendant and his enterprises during the years in question.

Ross sought to rebut the Government's case by asserting that he had a substantial cash accumulation from years prior to the tax years in question, and that he received large cash gifts (several hundred thousand

dollars) from his father, W. C. Ross, who died in 1969. The Government sought to refuse this assertion by offering the testimony of an IRS agent who had analyzed W. C. Ross' personal income tax returns and the monthly accounting statements of the W. C. Ross & Son partnership from 1952 through 1968. The tax returns for 1952 through 1968 were introduced into evidence,[1] as were the accounting statements of W. C. Ross & Son for 1952 through 1964, except for 1956. Although a few monthly statements for this period were not introduced, the vast majority were. Defendant made no objection to the introduction of this evidence.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. Defendant filed several motions for a new trial, arguing that the Government had seized the records of the W. C. Ross & Son partnership from Taylor in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and in violation of the Government's agreement with him; also, that the Government had failed to produce materials described in defendant's pretrial motion for discovery, which had been granted by the court, as well as other evidence required to be disclosed under Brady v. State of Maryland, *supra*. These post-trial motions were denied, and defendant brought this appeal.

II. The Adequacy of Pretrial Discovery

A. Failure to Raise This Alleged Error at Trial

Defendant argues on this appeal that the trial court partially denied his discovery motion. The record shows, however, that the motion was granted by the trial judge without qualification. Whether an error was committed is, of course, affected by the extent of defend-

[1] The Government also introduced certificates of assessments and payments of W. C. Ross for the years 1941 through 1968. These, in conjunction with the tax returns, showed that W. C. Ross earned $147,000 during that period.

ant's efforts, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(g),[2] to bring to the court's attention any alleged noncompliance by the Government with his discovery requests.

The records of W. C. Ross & Son were introduced during the prosecution's case. Defendant was aware that the boxes of records stored at his stepbrother's business contained the financial statements introduced into evidence, yet no motion to suppress this evidence was offered until defendant's motion for a new trial, made after the jury's verdict was received and 43 witnesses and 1,300 pages of transcript later.[3] Moreover, during the prosecution's case an IRS agent testified (and defense counsel stipulated) that the stepbrother Taylor was the source of the records.[4]

This Court and others have criticized failure to raise alleged discovery errors promptly. *See* United States v. Fink, 5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1, 7; United States v. James, 5 Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 434, 436-437; United

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[2] Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(g) states, in relevant part:

> If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

[3] Defense counsel did attempt to lodge a general objection to all documents introduced: "to be certain, Your Honor, if there is anything that the Court ordered them to give us, and if they didn't do it, I want the record to reflect that." Tr. at 381. The prosecution objected, and the court properly treated defendant's objection as applying to the document then being introduced, which is not at issue on this appeal.

[4] *Cf.* United States v. Hauff, 7 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 1350, 1353; United States v. Baxter, 9 Cir., 1973, 492 F.2d 150, 173, where defendants, upon learning that the Government had not complied with their discovery requests, moved for a mistrial.

States v. Baxter, *supra*.[5] Defendant's ample opportunity to ask the trial court to order the Government to comply with his request for documents must be taken into account in determining whether error was committed in denying the motions for a new trial.

B. The Provisions of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b) and the Standard of Review

Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b) provides, in relevant part:

> (b) *Other Books, Papers, Documents, Tangible Objects or Places.* Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the government, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable.

The operative terms of the rule are "materiality" and "reasonable." The phrase "the court may order" in the text of Rule 16(b) clearly indicates that the granting of discovery motions is a matter of the trial court's discretion. In judging the correctness of the trial court's conclusion that the evidence not tendered by the Government was not material and that defendant's request for such materials (as clarified and renewed in his motion for a new trial) was not reasonable, we will not interfere with the trial court's ruling in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Stone, 5 Cir., 1973,

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[5] *See* United States v. Armes, 6 Cir., 1972, 470 F.2d 1353, 1355; United States v. Cook, 7 Cir., 1970, 432 F.2d 1093, 1101; United States v. Indiviglio, 2 Cir., 1965, 352 F.2d 276, 280. *See generally* Colella v. United States, 1 Cir., 1966, 360 F.2d 792, 800. *Cf.* United States v. Wolfson, 2 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 804, 808.

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472 F.2d 909, 916.[6] We find no abuse of discretion in this regard.

C. Materiality of the Disputed Documents

As a matter of general construction "[t]he measure of discovery permitted by the Rules of Criminal Procedure is not intended to be as broad as in a civil case." Clay v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 397 F.2d 901, 915, vac. on other grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969). Materiality means more than that the evidence in question bears some abstract logical relationship to the issues in the case. *See* United States v. Schembari, 4 Cir., 1973, 484 F.2d 931, 935 (fact that photographs in Government's possession were of demonstration during which defendant was arrested held insufficient to show materiality) There must be some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed evidence would have enabled the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor. The extensiveness of the material which the Government did produce, United States v. Hildebrand, 5 Cir., 1974, 506 F.2d 406, 409, and the availability of the disputed material from other sources, including the defendant's own knowledge, must also be considered. *See* United States v. Felts, 5 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 80, 82.[7]

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[6] *See* United States v. Saitta, 5 Cir., 1971, 443 F.2d 830, 831; United States v. Hancock, 5 Cir., 1971, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286; United States v. Baxter, 9 Cir., 1973, 492 F.2d 150, 175; Mullins v. United States, 8 Cir., 1973, 487 F.2d 581, 589; United States v. Smaldone, 10 Cir., 1973, 484 F.2d 311, 320-321; United States v. Newman, 3 Cir., 1973, 476 F.2d 733, 739; United States v. Armes, 6 Cir., 1972, 470 F.2d 1353, 1355; United States v. Lewis, 7 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d 486, 492; United States v. Jordan, 2 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 610, 615; Walsh v. United States, 1 Cir., 1967, 371 F.2d 436, 437.

[7] *See* United States v. Toombs, 5 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 88, 93; United States v. Hancock, 5 Cir., 1971, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286-1287; United States v. Bland, 5 Cir., 1970, 432 F.2d 96, 97; United States v. Brawer, 2 Cir., 1974, 496 F.2d 703, 705; United States v. Barnes,

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The Government gave defendant a complete summary of the computations and data on which it based its calculation of defendant's net worth and income for the tax years in question. The only point on which the disputed records were relevant was whether Ross' father had sufficient income to be able to make the cash gifts that were the basis of one of Ross' defenses. Defendant's accountant testified that copies of the profit and loss statements of W. C. Ross & Son introduced by the Government, as well as copies of those not introduced from earlier years, were customarily kept on file in the accountant's office. Therefore, it is different to understand how obtaining the Government's copies of these reports could have materially aided Ross' defense, especially since defendant did not dispute the total amount of income attributed by the Government to W. C. Ross as evidenced by the tax returns, certificates of assessments and payments, and the IRS agent's testimony. Documents showing W. C. Ross' income from one source, the partnership, for the months not covered in the Government's proof, would be relevant only if defendant disputed the amount of income attributable to W. C. Ross from all sources combined. It follows that the receipts and other primary sources from which the tax returns and accounting statements were prepared are also not material, and would only have duplicated the testimony of defendant's accountant concerning his preparation of the returns and statements.

The most persuasive evidence that the trial court did not err in his ruling on this issue is found in defendant's lack of interest in the documents until some of them were introduced at trial. Deloy Ross' testimony shows he was well aware of the contents of these boxes of records. He was also aware that the records were

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8 Cir., 1973, 486 F.2d 776, 779; Xydas v. United States, 1971, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 184, 445 F.2d 660, 668.

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no longer in the store as of the middle of 1971, two years after the IRS began its investigation but nearly two full years before any indictments were handed down.

D. Reasonableness of Defendant's Discovery Request

Irrespective of the materiality of the documents requested by defendant, we believe the request was not reasonable, as required by Rule 16(b), under all the circumstances. To be reasonable a request for documents must not be unduly burdensome to the Government, and, equally important, must be framed in sufficiently specific terms to show the Government what it must produce. *See* United States v. Hauff, 7 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 1350, 1355. General descriptions of the materials sought and conclusory arguments as to their materiality have been rejected repeatedly as insufficient under Rule 16(b). United States v. White, 5 Cir., 1971, 450 F.2d 264, 267.[8]

If a defendant is requesting documents he has never seen, he obviously cannot designate specifically the items sought, although a concrete showing of materiality is still required. *See* United States v. Hughes, 5 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 1244, 1254. In this case, however, defendant was familiar with the disputed documents and knew they had been removed from their place of storage; yet nowhere in defendant's discovery motion is there any specific mention of these documents.[9] Not until his mo-

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[8] *See* United States v. Hughes, 5 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 1244, 1254; Downing v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 348 F.2d 594, 599; United States v. Moore, 6 Cir., 1971, 439 F.2d 1107, 1108; United States v. Conder, 6 Cir., 1970, 423 F.2d 904, 910; United States v. Evanchik, 2 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 950, 953; United States v. Fioravanti, 3 Cir., 1969, 412 F.2d 407, 411; United States v. Jordan, 2 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 610, 615.

[9] We do not believe that defendant's request for all documents "belonging" to him was sufficient to notify the Government that it

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tion for a new trial did defendant specifically request the documents in question and specifically state why he believed they were material. Under the circumstances, defendant's discovery request was not sufficiently specific to apprise the Government of what was sought or to permit the trial court to determine in a timely fashion whether material evidence had not been produced.

E. Harmless Error

If, contrary to our interpretation of this case, error was committed by the trial court, we are convinced it was harmless. *See* United States v. Hildebrand, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 406, 408-410.[10] The evidence of this defendant's guilt is very substantial. The Government showed that Ross had regularly withheld substantial amounts of cash from his business deposits, and had used some of this cash to purchase Treasury bonds (the income from which was not reported) and bank money orders, putting the remainder in a special bank account. Ross' defenses of prior cash accumulation and gifts from his father were refuted by proof that Ross, by his own admission, had invested all of his accumulated cash in his motel business, and by proof that his father had insufficient income to make the large cash gifts alleged.

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was being asked for his father's personal records and for the records of a business no longer owned by the defendant. As the District Court noted, whether Ross had legal title to the papers was hardly clear. Moreover, proprietary interest is no longer a relevant criterion under Rule 16(b). *See* United States v. Crisona, S.D.N.Y., 1967, 271 F.Supp. 150, aff'd 2 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 107.

[10] *See* United States v. Rojas, 5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1042, 1045; United States v. White, 5 Cir., 1971, 450 F.2d 264, 268; United States v. Hinkle, 1973, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 487 F.2d 1205, 1206-1207; United States v. Hauff, 7 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 1350, 1355; United States v. Bryant, 1971, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 448 F.2d 1182, 1184; United States v. DeLeo, 1 Cir., 1970, 422 F.2d 487, 499; United States v. Crisona, 2 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 107, 115.

This Court has held that "an error in administering the discovery rules is not reversible absent a showing that the error was prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant." United States v. James, 5 Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 434, 436. *See* United States v. Miller, 5 Cir., 1974, 500 F.2d 751, 755; United States v. Saitta, 5 Cir., 1971, 443 F.2d 830, 831; Mullins v. United States, 8 Cir., 1973, 487 F.2d 581, 589; United States v. Jordan, 2 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 610, 615. In this case the accounting records introduced by the Government, although not produced before trial, were discussed in the IRS agent's report, which was furnished to defendant several days before the records were offered in evidence. Thus, even if the records should have been produced before trial, we believe defendant had sufficient opportunity to consider this evidence, or at least to request more time. *See* United States v. James, *supra*, 495 F.2d at 436-437; Pierce v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 414 F.2d 163, 169; United States v. Amabile, 7 Cir., 1968, 395 F.2d 47, 52; United States v. Knohl, 2 Cir., 1967, 379 F.2d 427, 441-442. As for the few monthly reports that were not introduced into evidence, defendant has failed to show any prejudice from not receiving those documents.

On the basis of this inquiry into the materiality of the evidence not produced, the reasonableness of defendant's discovery requests, and the possibility of prejudice, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial on grounds of noncompliance with its discovery order. *See* United States v. Smaldone, 10 Cir., 1973, 484 F.2d 311, 320-321; Meyer v. United States, 8 Cir., 1968, 396 F.2d 279, 283.

III. Failure to Disclose *Brady* Material

Defendant also contended in his motion for a new trial that the Government had failed to disclose evidence favor-

able and material to his defense, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The evidence not disclosed in this case is far different in importance from the evidence prosecutors have been required to divulge under *Brady*. *Cf.* Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972) (misidentification of defendant by prosecution witness on an earlier occasion, and diagram of murder scene showing poor vantage point of eyewitness); United States v. Frick, 5 Cir., 1973, 490 F.2d 666, 671 (promise not to oppose probation of Government witness).[11]

Moreover, the trial court examined the documents *in camera* and specifically found that none was exculpatory—a method of dealing with *Brady* contentions that this Court and others have approved. *See* United States v. Sanchez, 5 Cir., 1975, 508 F.2d 388; Flanagan v. Henderson, 5 Cir., 1974, 496 F.2d 1274, 1277; Taglianetti v. United States, 1 Cir., 1968, 398 F.2d 558, 572, aff'd 394 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 1099, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969). We find no basis for overturning the trial court's finding. As was true in United States v. Register, 5 Cir., 1974, 496 F.2d 1072, 1081,

> [a]n *in camera* examination by the trial judge confirmed the government's statement that [the evidence in question] contained no exculpatory *Brady* material. We will not go beyond the trial court's finding to encourage shipping prosecutor's files to

[11] United States v. Tashman, 5 Cir., 1973, 478 F.2d 129 (unspecified promise to coconspirator contingent upon the value of his testimony); Evans v. Janing, 8 Cir., 1973, 489 F.2d 470 (police report stating that an eyewitness had failed to identify a photograph of the defendant); United States v. Poole, 7 Cir., 1967, 379 F.2d 645 (physician's report in rape case concluding there was no evidence of penetration); Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 4 Cir., 1964, 331 F.2d 842 (ballistics and fingerprint reports showing that a revolver not belonging to the defendant was used in the crime); United States v. Wilkins, 2 Cir., 1964, 326 F.2d 135 (existence of two disinterested eyewitnesses who would have testified that defendant was not involved in robbery).

the appellate court whenever the defense cries *Brady*.

IV. Government Misconduct in Acquiring the Disputed Documents

Defendant argues that in acquiring the business records from his stepbrother Taylor, the Government broke its promise not to remove or Xerox his records. It is true that breach of a promise made to a defendant by Government officials violates due process in some circumstances. *See* Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); United States v. Scanland, 5 Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 1104, 1106. In this case, however, there was no such breach. The IRS agents asked defendant for records from 1965 through 1969. He provided these at his accountant's office on the condition that they not remove or copy the records. The agreement clearly related only to those specific records and did not obligate the agents, as defendant argues, to ignore documents discovered through other sources.

The manner in which the records were acquired from Taylor was also entirely proper.[12] The IRS agents secured some of these records from an attorney who handled Taylor's claims against his mother's estate and the remaining records from Taylor himself. Obtaining these documents was proper, because they were undertaken with the consent of Taylor and his attorney. *See* United States v. Thompson, 5 Cir., 1970, 421 F.2d 373; Holzhey v. United States, 5 Cir., 1955, 223 F.2d 823; United States v. DiPrima, 1 Cir., 1973, 472 F.2d 550; Shorey v. Warden, Maryland State Penitentiary, 4 Cir., 1968, 401 F.2d 474. *Cf.* Comment, Third-Party Consent Searches:

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[12] Because we have concluded that defendant cannot prevail on the merits of this issue, we need not determine whether he has established his standing to contest the searches at issue. *See* Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973).

An Alternative Analysis, 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 121 (1973). The trial court correctly found that there was "not the slightest evidence of any overbearing threat, trick or deception on the government's part."

Having reviewed all of defendant's contentions carefully, we find no reversible error.

Affirmed.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

October Term, 1974

No. 74-2969

D. C. Docket Nos. CR-20,406 & CR-20,550

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DELOY C. ROSS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

Before AINSWORTH, GODBOLD and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel;

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.

April 21, 1975

Issued as Mandate:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 74-2969

[Filed May 23, 1975, U. S. Court of Appeals,
Edward W. Wadsworth, Clerk]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

DELOY C. ROSS,
Defendant-Appellant.

ON CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION of the appellant in the above numbered and entitled cause for a stay of the mandate of this Court therein, to enable appellant to apply for and to obtain a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States. IT IS ORDERED that the issuance of the mandate of this Court in said cause be, and the same is stayed to and including June 15, 1975, the stay to continue in force until the final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court, provided that within the period above mentioned there shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court the certificate of the Clerk of the Supreme Court that certiorari petition has been filed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue the mandate upon the filing of a copy of an order of the Supreme Court denying the writ, or upon the expiration of the stay granted herein, unless the above mentioned certificate shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court within that time.

/s/ Robert A. Ainsworth
United States Circuit Judge

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 74-1551

DELOY C. ROSS, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, petitioner was convicted on five counts of willfully attempting to evade and defeat his individual income taxes for the years 1966 through 1968, and the income taxes of Ross Investments, Inc., for the years 1968 and 1969, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7201. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent three-year terms of imprisonment of four of the counts and fined $10,000 on each of those four counts. The court suspended the imposition of sentence on the remaining count and placed petitioner on three years' probation. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. A).

The case was tried by use of the net worth method, and the proof showed total unreported income of more than $344,000, of which $229,000 was attributed to petitioner, and $115,000 to Ross Investments, Inc. (Tr. 892, 902, 914, 917, 923). Petitioner's principal defense was that during

the prosecution years he had received gifts of several hundred thousand dollars in cash from his father, who had died in 1969. However, the evidence showed that during the period from 1952 through 1968, petitioner's father earned only $149,000 (Tr. 929-930), an average of $8,800 per year. Of this amount, petitioner's father left $91,000 in the partnership business known as W.C. Ross & Son, in which petitioner and his father were partners, to purchase assets, and the father withdrew $57,000 to live on and to pay his income taxes (Tr. 930).

1. Petitioner first contends (Pet. 13-17) that the government improperly obtained the partnership records of W. C. Ross & Son from William Taylor, who had stolen them. However, the evidence showed that Taylor did not steal the records in question. To the contrary, he had a substantial proprietary interest in the partnership records and maintained custody and control of them with petitioner's knowledge and consent. Until 1968, the W. C. Ross & Son partnership was operated by petitioner and his father. In 1968, petitioner and his father sold the business to William Taylor, a stepbrother to petitioner, and several boxes containing the partnership records remained on the business premises (Pet. App. 2a; Tr. 1802). Thus, as the purchaser of the partnership business, Taylor had a legitimate interest in its records. Moreover, since Taylor's mother was Mrs. W. C. Ross, the widow of petitioner's father, Taylor also had a proprietary interest in the records in his capacity as an heir to his mother's estate. (See Articles 884 and 888, Louisiana Statutes Annotated, Civil Code (1952).)

Finally, petitioner knew of and consented to Taylor's status as custodian of the records (Tr. 1795). The evidence showed that in May 1969, petitioner went to Taylor's store and removed only part of the records for the years 1965

through 1967, for inspection by the Internal Revenue Service (Tr. 1773). The partnership records included bank statements, profit and loss statements, copies of petitioner's and his father's income tax returns, and other business records (Tr. 1794). In September 1970, Taylor took the remaining partnership records to an attorney in order to investigate his claims against his mother's estate (Pet. App. 2a; Tr. 1811-1814). In March 1971, Taylor retrieved some of these partnership records and turned them over to Internal Revenue Service agents, in response to their request (Pet. App. 2a). The agents received the remaining partnership records, consisting of three boxes, directly from the attorney, with Taylor's permission (*ibid.*; Tr. 1822-1824). In mid-1971, petitioner realized that the partnership records were no longer in the store (Tr. 1800). However, from that time until the time of trial in June 1974, petitioner made no attempt to locate either Taylor or the records (Tr. 1805). Indeed, when the government introduced the portions of the partnership records into evidence, petitioner's counsel not only did not object but stipulated that they all "came from Mr. Walter [*sic*] Taylor, the natural son of Mrs. W. C. Ross" (Tr. 813).

Since petitioner made no pretrial motion to suppress these records or any objection to their introduction at trial, he had no basis to complain on appeal about the circumstances of their acquisition by the government. At all events, there is no merit to his claim. Not only did Taylor have a joint ownership interest in the records with petitioner, but he also had petitioner's permission to have the custody and control of them. Thus, Taylor's consent to hand over the documents to the government agents was sufficient to justify the government's use of them. *United States* v. *Matlock*, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 171; *Frazier* v. *Cupp*, 394 U.S. 731, 740; *Couch* v. *United States*, 409 U.S. 322, 328,

331-332, n. 14. See also *Bellis* v. *United States*, 417 U.S. 85, 97-100. Under these circumstances, the court of appeals correctly concluded (Pet. App. 13a) that "[t]he manner in which the records were acquired from Taylor was * * * entirely proper" because "they were undertaken with the consent of Taylor and his attorney."

2. Petitioner further argues (Pet. 8-12) that the government's failure to turn over the partnership records to him for his pretrial inspection was reversible error. Before trial, petitioner filed a broad motion for discovery of all documents which the government intended to use as evidence in the case, as well as all documents obtained from or belonging to him. The district court granted this motion, and the government turned over to petitioner a set of computations and data sheets used to reconstruct petitioner's income by the net worth method (Pet. App. 3a). The government turned over no other documents, and petitioner did not renew his request for any additional documents. As the court of appeals pointed out (*id.* at 8a), the "only point on which the disputed [partnership] records were relevant was whether Ross' father had sufficient income to be able to make the cash gifts that were the basis of one of Ross' defenses." But as the court of appeals further noted (*ibid.*), petitioner's own accountant testified that copies of the partnership's profit and loss statements were customarily maintained in his office. Thus, petitioner's failure to receive copies of the reports did not interfere with his defense, especially since he did not dispute the amount of income attributed to his father by the government's evidence.

Moreover, petitioner evinced a total lack of interest in the documents in question until after some of them were introduced at trial (see Pet. App. 8a-9a). Although petitioner was aware that the partnership records stored at his stepbrother's place of business included the profit and loss statements, he made no motion to suppress this evidence

until after the jury's verdict was received (*id.* at 5a). Under these circumstances, the court of appeals correctly held that there was "no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial on grounds of noncompliance with its discovery order" (*id.* at 11a).

3. Finally, petitioner urges (Pet. 11) that the partnership records not introduced into evidence may have contained some exculpatory material that he was entitled to inspect. The partnership records not offered in evidence consisted of bank statements, copies of petitioner's and his father's income tax returns, and other documents supporting the profit and loss statements (Govt. Exs. 238 through 261), such as checks, check stubs and invoices (Tr. 396-463, 1794). The profit and loss statements were thoroughly discussed and their method of preparation was explained in detail during the testimony of the accountant who prepared them (Tr. 396-463). The supporting documents which were not introduced into evidence were kept in three large boxes and examined by the trial judge over the course of an entire morning, and not for 30 minutes as petitioner now claims (Pet. 11) for the first time. After this examination, the trial judge concluded that the documents contained no exculpatory material (Pet. App. 12a). Since the profit and loss statements were not exculpatory, but indeed tended to support the government's case, it is obvious that the corollary and supporting documents behind the profit and loss statements were also not exculpatory. Accordingly, the court of appeals correctly held (*id.* at 11a-12a) that *Brady* v. *Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, upon which petitioner relied below, had no application.

For the reasons stated, it is respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

ROBERT H. BORK,
Solicitor General.

AUGUST 1975.